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Investigate the origins 
of COVID-19
On 30 December 2019, the Program for 
Monitoring Emerging Diseases notified 
the world  about a pneumonia of unknown 
cause in Wuhan, China (1). Since then, 
scientists have made remarkable progress in 
understanding the causative agent, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2), its transmission, pathogene-
sis, and mitigation by vaccines, therapeutics, 
and non-pharmaceutical interventions. Yet 
more investigation is still needed to deter-
mine the origin of the pandemic. Theories 
of accidental release from a lab and zoonotic 
spillover both remain viable. Knowing how 
COVID-19 emerged is critical for inform-
ing global strategies to mitigate the risk of 
future outbreaks. 
In May 2020, the World Health 
Assembly requested that the World Health 
Organization (WHO) director-general work 
closely with partners to determine the 
origins of SARS-CoV-2 (2). In November, 
the Terms of Reference for a China–WHO 
joint study were released (3). The informa-
tion, data, and samples for the study’s first 
phase were collected and summarized by 
the Chinese half of the team; the rest of the 
team built on this analysis. Although there 
were no findings in clear support of either 
a natural spillover or a lab accident, the 
team assessed a zoonotic spillover from an 
intermediate host as “likely to very likely,” 
and a laboratory incident as “extremely 
unlikely” [(4), p. 9]. Furthermore, the two 
theories were not given balanced consider-
ation. Only 4 of the 313 pages of the report 
and its annexes addressed the possibility 
of a laboratory accident (4). Notably, WHO 
Director-General Tedros Ghebreyesus com-
mented that the report’s consideration of 
evidence supporting a laboratory accident 
was insufficient and offered to provide 
additional resources to fully evaluate the 
possibility (5).
As scientists with relevant expertise, we 
agree with the WHO director-general (5), 
the United States and 13 other countries (6), 
and the European Union (7) that greater 
clarity about the origins of this pandemic is 
necessary and feasible to achieve. We must 
take hypotheses about both natural and 
laboratory spillovers seriously until we have 
sufficient data. A proper investigation should 
be transparent, objective, data-driven, 
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inclusive of broad expertise, subject to 
independent oversight, and responsibly 
managed to minimize the impact of conflicts 
of interest. Public health agencies and 
research laboratories alike need to open their 
records to the public. Investigators should 
document the veracity and provenance of 
data from which analyses are conducted 
and conclusions drawn, so that analyses are 
reproducible by independent experts. 
Finally, in this time of unfortunate anti-
Asian sentiment in some countries, we note 
that at the beginning of the pandemic, it was 
Chinese doctors, scientists, journalists, and 
citizens who shared with the world crucial 
information about the spread of the virus—
often at great personal cost (8, 9). We should 
show the same determination in promoting 
a dispassionate science-based discourse on 
this difficult but important issue.
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